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Abstract— In this paper, we propose a subnetwork key
management strategy in which the heterogeneous security
requirements of a wireless sensor network are considered to
provide differing levels of security with minimum communication
overhead. Additionally, it allows the dynamic creation of high
security subnetworks within the wireless sensor network and
provides subnetworks with a mechanism for dynamically
creating a secure key using a novel and dynamic group key
management protocol. The proposed energy-efficient protocol
utilizes a combination of pre-deployed group keys and initial
trustworthiness of nodes to create a level of trust between
neighbors in the network. This trust is later used to allow secure
communication between neighbors when creating a dynamic,
high security subnetwork within the sensor network. Results of
simulations of the protocol in Ns2 are presented and the
complexity of the protocol is analyzed. The proposed protocol
reduces delay by 50% and energy consumption by 70% over the
existing dynamic group key management (DGKM) scheme.
Keywords-component;
wireless
sensor
management, energy efficiency, network security

network,

key

I.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks have recently come into the
forefront of research due to their possible uses in military and
disaster relief cases. Wireless sensor networks (WSN's) are a
highly constrained type of network, comprised of sensor nodes
with limited capabilities and larger gateway nodes with more
capabilities. In sensor networks, the toughest constraints
include the limited available energy and memory. Thus,
lightweight and energy-efficient security protocols are
necessary for these networks.
Some papers in literature investigate the use of dynamic
key management techniques in WSNs [1]. Dynamic keys are
preferable over pre-deployed keys because they minimize the
number of keys that must be stored by nodes. Additionally, the
key can be changed frequently, decreasing the ability for
adversaries to determine the network's key. In the paper by
Panja et al. [1], a secure and dynamic group key management
(DGKM) protocol is proposed utilizing a modified Tree Based
Group Diffie-Hellmann key management protocol [2]. This
protocol allows clusters in a sensor network to dynamically
create a key for the cluster by having nodes create partial keys
from the leaves of the group up to the root. Nodes use the
partial keys of their children as inputs to the function Įk mod p
where p is a prime number, k is the result of an xor'ing of two
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of the node's children's partial keys and Į is a primitive root of
p. The cluster head aggregates the partial keys of all the nodes
and creates a group key which is then broadcasted to the group.
The majority of previous literature considers the needs of
security in a WSN to be homogenous in nature. In practice, this
may not be true as many nodes in a sensor network may be in
an idle state or transmitting information of little importance.
These nodes do not need to operate at a high security level that
consumes large amounts of energy. This paper introduces a
novel security protocol for sensor networks that utilizes the
heterogeneous nature of the security requirements of sensor
networks to realize two distinct security and energy levels
within the network. The protocol allows the majority of a
network to operate in a low security mode with static keys that
conserves energy, while dynamically creating keys for high
security subnetworks. This dynamic key creation protocol uses
a subtree energy average function to determine the subtree or
subtrees to be used to create the dynamic partial keys. This
subtree energy average function conserves energy over the
DGKM protocol since the number of nodes in the subnetwork
may be much greater than the number of partial keys desired
for the protocol. Additionally, we propose a method to combine
a static and dynamic key management protocol to create a
hybrid protocol.
The proposed protocol allows the network to form a high
security subnetwork localized around a sensing event in the
network. This aspect of the protocol relaxes the assumption of
homogenous security needs of a network that is present in most
literature on sensor network security. We observe that often a
sensed event will span over more than one of the clusters
present in a typical sensor network. Thus, all the nodes in each
affected cluster must come out of idle state and several keys
must be used to communicate the event back to the base
station. This observation was addressed recently in the paper by
Ratnaraj et al. [3] from a routing perspective and our protocol
further improves security and energy efficiency.
In general, a set of pre-deployed keys have to be stored at
each node in WSN in order to initialize secure communication.
Next, a dynamic key management scheme is needed to create
new and revoke old or compromised keys. Rigorous work has
been published on random pre-deployment of keys [7-10]
where a limited number of pair-wise or partial keys are
randomly assigned to nodes before deployment. In general, the
number of necessary pre-deployed keys or partial keys

The SOS protocol assumes the network is monitoring
localized, random events. Nodes sensing an event, will measure
their proximity to the event by measuring the strength of the
signal they are receiving. If the sensed signal strength is greater
than a design threshold, then such nodes will group themselves
into a subnetwork. Once the subnetwork has been established,
the nodes exchange their energy remaining and a number of
cluster heads are chosen based on energy remaining, proximity
to the event, and size of the subnetwork. Nodes are then
clustered by proximity to the chosen CH's.

increases with network size [7-9]. A prior or explicit
knowledge about deployment as used in [8] and [9] can only
reduce the number of required pre-deployed keys, but it still
will increase with network size. In contrast the proposed
scheme requires only 3 keys to be initially stored by each node
regardless of the network size and deployment pattern.
Consequently, the scheme is a fully scalable solution which
simplifies pre-deployment preparations.
Furthermore, to enable secure communication between any
pair of neighbor nodes a session key has to be established.
Typically, a shared key is used since low complexity and
energy requirements of the shared-key encryption schemes.
Such a pair-wise key can be either generated from predeployed partial keys [7-8], or found among the pre-deployed
keys [9-10], or established through a third party who shares the
pair-wise keys with each of the nodes in the pair [7-10]. In
contrast, the proposed scheme dynamically creates pair-wise
keys between neighbor nodes during short initial postdeployment phase. The scheme reduced energy consumption
by employing simple and basic cryptography mechanisms.
When a high security subnetwork is created, the stronger key is
setup at the expense of higher energy consumption. However,
the overall energy consumption is reduced when compared
with homogenous schemes which always have to use the high
security mechanisms. In contrast, the proposed scheme
employs the energy-expensive high security methods only
when needed.

Nodes are expected to know the number of nodes that are
part of the same subtree or cluster and part of the same level as
itself. The number of nodes that are part of cluster i on level j.
is denoted as nij. Additionally, cluster heads are expected to
know the remaining energy of all the nodes that are members
of their cluster. These assumptions will all be fulfilled since the
SOS protocol [3] is used.
III.

This protocol uses two separate key management schemes:
for a group-wide and subnetwork key management. The first
scheme manages a group-wide key and individual keys. The
group-wide key is used for non-critical broadcast messages
between nodes. The individual keys are used for secure
communication between nodes creating a subnetwork and
setting up a subnetwork key. The second key management
scheme is creating and distributing the keys for the
dynamically created subnetworks. Securely distributing the
keys for the subnetworks created by events within the sensor
network is a non-trivial problem since the subnetworks may
contain any arbitrary set of neighboring nodes. These nodes all
must have a mechanism to securely communicate with each
other to distribute the subnetwork key to all the subnetwork
members.

In this paper we analyze the proposed protocol and compare
against other protocols in literature in terms of complexity of
the key management algorithm, and communication and
storage overhead. Simulations are performed in Ns2,
comparing the energy consumed in the simulation environment
to other protocols in a fully functioning network as well as in a
network with node failures. It is found that the protocol
consumes less energy, uses less messages and is more scalable
than LEAP and the Dynamic Key Management Protocol and
provides a similar level of security.
II.

PROTOCOL DETAILS

A. Group-wide and Individual Keys
The protocol begins with deployment of the network.
Before the network is deployed, three values must be stored in
each node. Two of these values will be common to each node
in the network. The first, K1, is a group-wide key that will be
used for group-wide communication between nodes not
involved in a subnetwork. The second value, K2, will be used
for exchanging pair-wise keys between neighboring nodes and
will be erased after time Tmin, similar to the LEAP protocol [2].
The third value, K3, is unique to each node and is stored on
both the node and the base station. This key can be used for
private messages between a node and the base station.

SENSOR NETWORK ARCHITECTURE

Sensor networks are often deployed remotely and the
network designers have no control over the location or
placement of the sensors in the terrain, or the relation to other
sensors around them. This paper considers a random node
deployment over a rectangular topography of varying size.
Once the nodes have been deployed, it is assumed that there is
a period of time Tmin where the nodes are not able to be
compromised by an enemy and can safely exchange keys [4].
Before the time Tmin, the nodes are responsible for broadcasting
their individual key to their 1-hop neighbors. These individual
keys can be created by the nodes by generating a random
number. When a sensing event occurs within the network, it is
assumed that the nodes around the event form into a
subnetwork with a hierarchy. The energy-efficient selforganizing protocol (SOS) discussed by Ratnaraj et al. in [3] is
employed in this application to create a subnetwork around an
event. The subnetwork includes a set of nodes that are
designated as Cluster Head's (CH's) that are above the other
nodes in the subnetwork in the hierarchy.

Remark 1. The EHKM protocol considers any new node
added after Tmin time as an intruder. This improves resilience to
security attacks from approaching enemy at the expense of
increased difficulty of adding a new legitimate node.
After deployment, nodes begin by transmitting a HELLO
message before time Tmin has elapsed. The HELLO message
will be structured in the following way:
Ni → 1 - hop : Node _ ID , E K 2 ( nonce ), MAC ( K 2, Node _ ID || nonce )
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(1)

nodes in the cluster must generate a partial key. For the last
cluster that was chosen, the depth field is set to (m –
sum(nother_clusters)). That is, the number of partial keys desired,
minus the number of nodes in all the other selected clusters.
This ensures that only exactly m partial keys are returned to the
HCH thus maximizing energy conservation.

The node’s HELLO message contains a random nonce
encrypted with K2, which serves as its secret key for any
messages it sends during the network's lifetime. Any node
receiving a HELLO message decrypts the nonce and verifies
the message using the MAC. With a successful verification, the
node stores the ID and nonce pair. Thus, whenever a node
receives a non-broadcast message in the future from a
neighbor, the node knows the packet was encrypted by the
nonce that is paired with the source's ID and is able to decrypt
the message. Once Tmin has elapsed, the nodes are responsible
for deleting K2 from their memories.
Remark 2. Key K2 is used during the Tmin time to
authenticate the nodes. The Tmin is set to be lower than a
minimum time required for attacker to compromise a node.
Hence, the attacking node will not know the K2 key and thus
fail the authentication.
B. Subnetwork Key Management Protocol
The subnetwork section of the key management protocol
begins with the creation of a subnetwork within the WSN.
First, the cluster heads find the average energy remaining for
all the nodes in their cluster.

avg _ energy (i ) = sum( Eij ) / ni

Once the HCH receives the required
the subnetwork, the HCH constructs the
broadcasts it to the subnetwork. This
encrypted with the individual keys of
transmitted throughout the subnetwork.

m partial keys from
subnetwork key and
subnetwork key is
the nodes as it is

C. Dynamic Cluster Key Management Algorithm
Once the network determines the clusters that will be
creating the partial keys and passing them to the head cluster
head, a variant of the dynamic group key management protocol
proposed in [1] by Panja et al. is used to generate the
subnetwork keys. In this protocol, the leaves begin the protocol
by randomly generating a partial key. This key is then passed to
the parent of the leaf node. Once the parent receives the partial
keys from two of its children, it is able to create its own partial
key by combining the two keys using a function f(partial key
child 1, partial key child 2). This function is represented as

(2)

where avg_energy(i) is the average energy per node in cluster i
which CHi is responsible for calculating, Eij is the energy left in
the j th node of the i th cluster and ni is the number of nodes in
cluster i. The cluster heads then send this value and the number
of nodes in their clusters to the other cluster heads. Then, the
Head Cluster Head (HCH) is selected among the cluster head
of the subnetwork. The cluster head with the highest average
energy left in its cluster becomes HCH.
HCH = CH (max( avg _ energy (i )))

When a node receives a start_algorithm message from its
cluster head, it checks the depth field to see if it is equal to -1.
If it equals -1, then the node rebroadcasts the message if the
node is not a leaf node. If the node is a leaf node, then it creates
its partial key and sends the key to its parent and its CH. If the
depth field does not equal -1, the node subtracts the number of
nodes in its level and cluster and if the depth field is still
greater than 0, rebroadcasts the message. If, after the
subtraction, the depth field becomes less than or equal to 0,
then the node acts as a leaf node and randomly creates its
partial key and sends the key to its parent and to the HCH.

(3)

f (k1, k 2) = αk 1 ⊕ k 2 mod p

The network has a predetermined number of partial keys
that are sufficient to create a subnetwork key that is determined
a priori. This value, m, has been suggested to be 15 in past
literature [1], but can be any value such that m partial keys of
length l will create a subnetwork key of sufficient length (m * l)
to be secure for the length of time the subnetwork is expected
to be active. Once the HCH has been determined, the other
cluster heads check to see if the number of nodes in the HCH's
cluster, nHCH, is sufficient to generate m partial keys. If it's not,
then the CH with the second highest average energy remaining
in its member nodes is added as chosen cluster. This method
continues until the number of nodes in the chosen clusters is
greater than m. Once sufficient cluster heads have been chosen
to generate the m partial keys that are needed, the algorithm is
started. The cluster heads broadcast a start_algorithm message
to their cluster with the cluster ID and the depth into the cluster
that the message should go before nodes begin creating partial
keys. The depth field in the messages allows the algorithm to
restrict partial key creation to the upper levels of a cluster's
hierarchy to conserve energy. For all the clusters chosen other
than the last one, the depth field is set to -1. This means that all
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(4)

where p is a prime number, α is a primitive root of p, and k1
and k2 are the children's partial keys (k1, k2 < p). The parent
then passes its partial key to its parent and passes the partial
keys of all its children to the cluster head. The cluster head
collects all the partial keys and combines them to form the
cluster key. Then, it broadcasts the key to the cluster.
The proposed protocol, unless otherwise specified, uses this
algorithm for subnetwork key creation and distribution. Several
modifications are made to the protocol to allow for more node
topologies. One modification is that the protocol no longer
assumes that all nodes are either leaves or have more than one
child. If a node only has one child, it waits to receive its child's
partial key then generates a random number as the second
partial key for the algorithm. Additionally, instead of
generating a key for only a cluster, the algorithm is expanded to
generate a key for an entire subnetwork.
Remark 3. In general, the traffic analysis attacks are a
considerable threat to hierarchical schemes. The proposed
EHKM counteracts such an attack by limiting the number of
exchanged messages which can hint the location of CHs.

Additionally, the rotation of CHs in the clustering scheme
ensures that traffic patterns change often. Moreover, the CHs
rotation will facilitate quick recovery in case of physical
destruction of a CH identified via the traffic pattern attack.
IV.

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

In this section, a performance analysis of the proposed
protocol is performed. This includes an analysis of the
complexity of the algorithm and the storage costs imposed
upon memory. Also, an analysis of the number of messages
that are sent is included. Finally, simulation results from Ns2
with a variety of network configurations and number of node
failures are analyzed.
A. Complexity Analysis
Table I displays the results of the complexity analysis on
the protocol and compares it to several existing key
management schemes. As can be seen the message cost and
complexity of the algorithm are both less than other schemes
such as LEAP and dynamic key management. Note, that for
most cases m << N.
TABLE I.
SetUp
Leap [4]
Dynamic
[1]
Proposed

COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Key Management

Storage

Messages

Messages

Complexity

N(1+5d)

2(d-1)^2/N+2N

O(d^2)

(3d+2+L)KL

-

3N

O(logN)

mlogN+k

N

3m+NS+NCH

O(logm)

(d+2)KL+k

where:
d

– average degree of connectivity of the network

N

– number of nodes in network

NS

– number of nodes in a subnetwork NS < N

M

– number of desired partial keys

KL

– individual key length (in bytes)

K

– dynamic subnetwork key length (in bytes)

L

– length of key chain

NCH

– Number of cluster heads in subnetwork

In Table I, the degree of the network is the average number
of nodes that are within communication range of a given node.
It is proportional to the density of nodes in the network and
may be a value from 10 to 20 for a reasonably dense network.
The setup cost of the protocols is measured in the number of
messages that must be sent by the network in order to initialize
the key management protocol. For the proposed protocol, each
node must send one message to initialize the protocol. This
leads to N messages being sent by the network. The LEAP
protocol has several rounds of key exchange between nodes
and their neighbors individually. This leads to a number of
message proportional to N as well as d.
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The number of messages that need to be sent by the
proposed protocol for the key management of the network is
measured from the time a subnetwork forms to the time a
subnetwork key is successfully distributed to the nodes of the
subnetwork. First the NCH cluster heads must distribute the
average energy left in their clusters. This results in NCH
messages. Then the start_algorithm message is distributed to m
nodes who reply, both to their parent and to their cluster head.
This causes 3m messages to be sent. Finally, the subnetwork
key is broadcasted to the NC nodes of the subnetwork. The time
complexity of this stage is log(m) since the 3m messages
dominates the NC and NCH messages. The LEAP protocol
requires several rounds of messages within a localized area and
then two rounds of broadcasting. For the dynamic protocol,
there are three rounds of messages for every cluster in the
network, leading to 3N messages being sent.
The storage of the proposed protocol is measured in terms
of how many bytes of storage must be used to store the keys of
the key management protocol. For the proposed protocol, a
node must store all the individual keys of nodes within
communication range of it. This is measured by the density of
the network, d. The number of bytes used to store the
individual keys is d * KL. The node must also store the
network-wide key and the key it shares with the base station.
Then each node must also store the subnetwork key, which is
of length k. The LEAP protocol stores 3 keys for each
neighbor, an individual key, a group key and a key chain with L
values. All of of these keys have length KL. The proposed
protocol has a lower storage cost than the LEAP protocol
(d*KL versus 3*d*KL) but will have a comparable storage cost
to the dynamic protocol for current network sizes. For a
network with the following properties (d = 20, N =1000, m =
20, KL = 10, k = 14) both the proposed protocol and DGKM
protocol require 214 bytes of memory for key storage.
B. Simulation Results
The proposed protocol was simulated in Ns2 and compared
to the dynamic key management protocol. The simulation
results are shown in the following subsections. For the
simulations, a 2-ray ground reflection model was used with
antennas 1m above the ground. A random distribution of 25, 50
and 100 nodes was simulated on topography of 1000m x
1000m, 2000m x 1000m and 2000m x 2000m respectively, to
keep node density at a constant 2.5x10-5 nodes / m2. A
subnetwork size of 25 nodes was used and the subnetwork was
split into three clusters whose size was based on orientation of
nodes in relation to assigned cluster heads. The number of
partial keys desired was set to 7 for this simulation and partial
key size messages were set to 4 bytes (32 bits). This would
result in a 224-bit subnetwork key. The routing protocol used
was AODV. The networks were simulated from network
deployment until the establishment of the subnetwork's first
key. The simulations were repeated with random node
placement and the results averaged. The performance of the
proposed EHKM protocol has been compared with another
group key-based scheme the DGKM [1].

1) One Subnetwork with 25 Nodes, Network Size of 50
Nodes
This simulation was run with a 50 node network and a
subnetwork of 25 nodes. The network was simulated from
deployment until the successful creation of the first subnetwork
key. The event that is being monitored is assumed to be in the
middle of the network and the SOS protocol is used to cluster
the nodes and form cluster heads. Three clusters were created
from the 25 node subnetwork in range of the sensed event. For
the SDGK protocol, two clusters of 25 nodes were utilized. The
network energy consumption was then measured.

the nodes in a cluster to generate a partial key even when the
number of nodes in the cluster may be much greater than m.
This causes excess partial keys to be sent to the cluster head
and increases the energy usage with the generation and
transmission of these partial keys.
With the proposed protocol combined with the subtree
energy average function, the number of partial keys generated
and sent to the subnetwork head is either equal to, or slightly
greater than m. Not all nodes in the subnetwork generate and
transmit partial keys. Additionally, nodes higher on the
hierarchy are chosen to generate the partial keys to further
minimize communication needed.

Figure 2. Energy utilized
Figure 1. Energy consumed per node

For the simulation it was found the total energy used in the
network for the proposed protocol was 2.73J and for the
dynamic key management protocol a total energy of 14.2J was
used. It is obvious from Figure 1, that the proposed protocol
uses significantly less energy than the dynamic key
management strategy. This is because not every node in the
subnetwork is responsible for generating a partial key and
transmitting it to the HCH. This allows nodes not in the chosen
clusters to conserve energy. Additionally, the proposed
protocol receives the necessary partial keys faster than in the
dynamic key management protocol. In this simulation, it took
0.08s for node 14 to receive the 7 partial keys. The dynamic
key protocol took 0.63s to gather the required partial keys.
2) One Network with 25 Nodes Results
The above simulation was run for a 25 and 100 node
network as well. The summary of the results can be found
below in Figures 2, 3 and 4. For the DKGM protocol, the
network was broken up into N/25 clusters of 25 nodes each.
As can be seen in Figures 2 through 4, the proposed
subnetwork modification of the dynamic group key
management protocol is more scalable to larger network sizes
than the existing dynamic group key management protocol in
terms of energy consumed, delay and number of packets
dropped. This is because the number of packets to create the m
desired partial keys is minimized by only involving the
minimum number of nodes. The DGKM protocol requires all
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Figure 3. Delay

C. Multiple Events in One Network
In the previous sections, only one generation of subnetwork
was considered. In this section, a network is considered where
multiple events take place over a period of time. In the
Dynamic Group Key Management protocol, it is assumed that
the groups would rekey regularly, using the same amount of
energy that was consumed during the initial key establishment
phase. The period of time between re-establishing keys is

defined as T. Since the proposed protocol differs from the DGK
protocol by rekeying every time a new event is sensed, it is of
interest to find how many events can occur per time period T to
allow the proposed protocol to continue to be more energy
efficient than the DGKM protocol. Several simulation
networks of varying sizes were established where events
periodically occurred within the network. The average energy
for establishing a subnetwork key for these events was found.
The results of these simulations can be found in Figure 5.

events that could occur in time period T and have the proposed
protocol continue to be more energy efficient than the DGKM
protocol.
As can be seen, the number of events that can occur in time
period T is above 5 for all network sizes tested. It is proposed
that events within a locale of a network will be both spatially
and temporally related. Thus an event in a network will likely
persist for sometime and then either propagate or disappear for
a significant period of time. In this case, the ability to monitor
more than 5 events in time period T with a consistent savings in
energy is sufficient to conclude that the proposed protocol will
conserve energy over the DGKM protocol in terms of key
creation and distribution over the lifetime of the network.
D. Node Failures
In this section the proposed protocol is tested with random
node failures in the network. The network size is set to 50
nodes and the number of nodes within the network that
randomly fail is varied. The energy consumed and the time-tocomplete the protocols are both measured.

Figure 4. Dropped packets

Figure 6. Energy cost of failed nodes

Figure 5. Energy and number of events per T

It can be seen that the average energy consumed to create
the subnetwork key is less than the energy consumed in Figure
2. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the initial key
establishment phase of individual keys is not needed for a preexisting network. Additionally, many AODV routes are found
in the first key establishment phase and need not be found
again. Thus, more energy can be conserved since route
discovery tasks are not required.
In Figure 5, the line with circle markers represents the
average energy in Joules needed to create a key for the
subnetwork dynamically generated to monitor the event in the
network. The line with x markers represents the number of
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Figure 7. Delay with failed nodes

As can be seen from Figures 6 and 7, while both protocols
are similarly resilient to failed nodes, the proposed protocol is
slightly more robust in the presence of node failures. This is
due to the fact that not every node is involved in the key
management process. Therefore, there is a chance that a node
failure will not affect the performance of the protocol at all and
the network will continue to function normally. Since the nodes
that participate in the key management protocol are physically
close to each other, when a node failure does affect the routing
of a message, fewer modifications to the routing table need to
be made. Due to the smaller numbers of participating nodes,
there is a lesser chance that the failed node has many layers of
routing table below itself.
V.

SECURITY

The following section discusses some salient aspects of the
security of the proposed protocol. The security of a network
can be measured in two ways. Assuming a secure encryption
algorithm is paired with the key management algorithm, the
main measurement of the security of a network will be the size
of the network key. All other aspects of a network being
equivalent, a network with a longer key size will remain secure
for a longer duration of time interval than that with a smaller
key size. The second measurement of the security of a key
management scheme is the attacks to which the protocol is able
to defend against and those that it is vulnerable to. This section
attempts to discuss some of these attacks and the defenses the
proposed protocol implements against them.
A. Network-wide and Individual Keys
This section of the paper describes the security of the static
aspect of the proposed protocol. This aspect of the protocol
includes a key common to all nodes in the network used for
broadcasting messages as well as the node's individual keys
used for localized communication.
When a sensor node is compromised it is assumed that the
adversary gains knowledge of all the keying materials present
in that sensor node. For the proposed protocol this would
include the broadcast key as well as the individual keys of the
neighboring nodes and the unique key shared with the base
station. The static aspect of this key management protocol
limits the affected area of a compromised node to a very small
portion of the network. A compromised node only gives the
adversary the keys of nodes immediately neighboring the
compromised node and the group key. In the case that this
compromise goes undetected, only broadcast messages and
local traffic will be compromised. For that reason, it is assumed
that broadcast messages from the base station do not need to be
confidential.
In the case that a compromise of a node is detected, an
efficient method of revoking the node from the network and
changing the network key and individual keys of the
neighboring nodes is needed. For our protocol a modification
of the node revocation described in the LEAP protocol [4] is
proposed.
1) Node Revocation
Changes in the group key may either be initiated by the
base station either periodically or after notification that a node

has been compromised. In either case, it is imperative that the
group key change messages from the base station be
authenticated to prevent forgery, replay and impersonation
attacks. In this paper, we use the μTESLA broadcast
authentication protocol proposed by Perrig et al. [6]. In the
μTESLA protocol, the controller creates a key chain and
preloads the last value of the key chain in the nodes before
deployment. The controller periodically releases the keys in its
key chain in the reverse order they were created in. The period
between key disclosures is called a μTESLA interval period.
The base station can then broadcast messages encrypted or
signed with the next key to be released. Nodes receiving a
μTESLA packet buffer the packets until the next key is
disclosed. This key can be authenticated through the next
μTESLA key to be released and the message can be
authenticated by the current key.
For this protocol, let n be the compromised node with set of
neighbors N={m1, m2, … mi}. Once the base station has been
notified of node n's compromise, it sends out a broadcast
message, X, to revoke node N from the network.
X : Controller → * : n, fk ' g (0), MAC (ki + 1, n || fk ' g (0)) (5)

where k'g is the new group key that will be released in a future
message, fk'g(0) is a pseudo random function based on k'g,
which all nodes possess and the value ki+1 is the next μTESLA
key to be released. The MAC allows nodes to authenticate the
message as originating from the base station when the
subsequent μTESLA key is released. Once a node has
authenticated the message, the value fk'g(0) is stored until the
new group key is received.
2) Secure Network Key Distribution
Once the base station is confident that all nodes have
received the node revocation message it broadcasts a new
group key message. The new group key, k'g is encrypted using
each node's individual key and broadcasted to its neighbors.
The neighbors verify the authenticity of the new group key
using the previously stored fk'g(0) then encrypt it using their
individual key and broadcast it to their neighbors. This process
continues except for nodes in the set N. Since node n has the
individual keys for these nodes, these nodes do not pass the
packet on immediately.
Nodes in the set of N first create a random key to be their
new individual key. They then wait a period of time, Tw, such
that it is likely that the neighboring nodes that are also in set N
have received the new group key. Tw could be set to be slightly
greater than the average propagation delay between two
arbitrary nodes in the network to allow the message to travel
from a neighbor of the originating node to another node in N.
Once this time has elapsed, the node broadcasts its new
individual key encrypted using the new group key. Through
this protocol the compromised node n is prevented from
learning the new group key or the new individual keys of its
neighboring nodes. Additionally, the base station can change
the group key periodically by broadcasting the message X in
the previous section without a node identifier. In this case, all
nodes will get the new group key. Nodes are also free to
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change their individual keys at any time by encrypting their
new individual key with the group key and sending the new
individual key to its neighbors. If a node receives a node
revocation message and has changed its individual key since
the last group update, it must update its individual key using
the new group key as soon as the new key has been
authenticated.
B. Dynamic Key Management
The integrity of the dynamic key management aspect of the
proposed protocol depends on the security of the static aspect
of the protocol since the partial keys and subnetwork keys are
both encrypted using the individual keys of the nodes while the
subnetwork key is being created. The subnetwork keys will be
secure as long as the guidelines for maintaining the integrity of
the individual keys are followed. Additionally, since the
subnetwork key formation is localized, compromised nodes
outside of radio communication range of the subnetwork will
not be able to eavesdrop on the partial keys or the subnetwork
key. In fact, these compromised nodes will not even be aware a
subnetwork is being formed.
Nodes only participate in the dynamic key management
aspect of this protocol. Consequently, if they are actively
involved in a subnetwork, a DOS attack is difficult to achieve
in this network structure. Nodes can pretend to be sensing an
event and attempt to create a subnetwork, but only other nodes
that are sensing the attack will be become a part of the
subnetwork. Nodes will also only reply to the start_algorithm
messages during the creation of a subnetwork key so the
subnetwork is safe from DOS attacks during that stage of the
protocol.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper a key management protocol was proposed
which combined a static and dynamic key management
approach to create a hybrid, energy-efficient, scalable key
management scheme. The protocol utilizes the ability to group
nodes into active subnetworks and passive groups and provide
differing levels of security to the different groups. The active
subnetworks utilize a dynamic key management approach
while the passive or inactive nodes rely on static key
management techniques. The use of dynamic key management
protocols for only the active portions of the network decreases
the amount of energy used and provides a more scalable
approach to key management. Additionally a protocol for
revoking a node from the network and for updating the network
key and node's individual keys was proposed.
The scheme was analyzed for complexity and simulated in
Ns2. It was compared to two schemes proposed in previous
literature and shown to be more energy efficient during key
generation and incurs lower delay and fewer packet losses. The
protocol was shown to be more scalable than other protocols as
network sizes get larger and nodes begin to fail.
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